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Abstract: This article seeks to define a certain form of exceptionalism – missionist 
exceptionalism – and ask to what extent it applies to Russia. The method will be a broad 
comparative analysis. The core argument is that missionist exceptionalism is fundamentally 
paradoxical; that polities make largely similar claims about themselves while pleading sui 
generis uniqueness. This hypothesis is asserted by examining the exceptionalism of other 
polities. These are two rivals of Russia; the United States and Poland, a “sentimental ally” 
of Russia, Serbia, and a country with a deep and interesting relationship with Russia, 
Israel.  
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Introduction 
With his written address to the American people (New York Times, September 12, 2013) Russian 
President Vladimir Putin provoked much debate. One aspect was of his letter was of compelling 
interest; Putin’s denial of Russian exceptionalism, and his rebuke of President Obama’s exceptionalist 
claims for the United States. It is generally naïve to take political leaders at their word, but there might 
be some historical significance in the claim of a Russian leader that Russia was just another country. 
Much Russian (and later Soviet) historical experience was predicated on the opposite argument, that 
Russia was unique in the world. 
Exceptionalism has several meanings and one in particular will be examined here. At the international 
level, all polities and cultures can claim some degree of uniqueness or particularism. There is nothing 
too controversial in such assertions, our cultures differ from each other, our countries and political 
circumstances are all conditional on location; famously it is said that “all politics are local”. Like all 
generalizations, it is oversimplified but there is nonetheless something in it. Two examples of 
exceptionalist claims – the assertion that unique circumstances apply and therefore ordinary rules do 
not apply – are the Irish party Sinn Fein and post-Dayton Bosnia. People have complained that Sinn 
Fein was judged by different standards and it got away with much that other parties in the British Isles 
could not. The term exceptionalism has also been used to describe the highly unique political structure 
that exists in Bosnia Herzegovina – the fact of two entities existing with one federal framework, and 
the multiple political offices and ministries and so on. In both cases the term exceptionalism is justified.  
For this paper we need to move beyond this definition and identify a more specific phenomenon. I 
propose to call this missionist exceptionalism. What is meant by this is a sense that a certain country is 
felt by its power elite – and probably many of its population – to have a unique place in the world, a 
distinct role to play, and importantly, due to the gravitas of this role, ordinary restraints – such as the 
rule of law – do not apply. Indeed few countries have had such a sense of role as Russia: no question 
has resonated through Russian social thought as much as Что делать? “What is to be done?” The 
missionist assumption is that something must be done. Missionist exceptionalism in this sense is more 
than simple nationalism, and goes a long way to resembling millennialism, but without its full religious 
literalism. Certainly when one examines exceptionalism historically, one see consistently 
religious/civilizational assertions at its core, but in the contemporary world, these assertions are 
expressed in more legal/rational language. In that sense what we are dealing with can be formalized as 
nationalism plus and millennialism minus. In this aspect, it problematizes that sacred/secular dichotomy 
to a high degree, see below.  
Furthermore it is useful to assert that missionist exceptionalism is less concerned with domestic 
policies and arrangement; it is rather international and relational, it exists viv-a-vis rival cultures and 
polities. To proceed, we can look at exceptionalist patterns in several countries and encounter a large 
paradox; that despite claims of uniqueness, most of the assertions of missionist exceptionalism are in 
fact repeated across the different polities make the assertions. They resemble each other to a large 
degree. If fact it is not too much to say that – from a sufficient critical distance – missionist 
exceptionalist claims are Macluhan: the claim is the message, the contents – allowing for local 
variations – are often generally familiar.  
In addition to Russia, four other countries will be sketched here, although interestingly each has a 
distinct relationship with Russia. One is a traditional rival, the United States, one a country that has 
fascinating relationship with Russia, Israel,1 and two fellow Slavonic counties, Serbia and (only to a 
                                                          
11 “…it was the Soviet Union that held a special fascination for us – both as the country of origin of most of the Jews then in 
Palestine…the Russian influence of the evolving ethos of Jewish Palestine was profound”. So wrote Shimon Peres in his 
memoir Battling for Peace (1995). Peres was born in Imperial Russia, as were nearly all of Israel’s foundational leaders; 
Chaim Weizmann, David Ben Gurion, Golda Meir, and Moshe Sharett. It would be only a slight exaggeration to say that 
Israel is a Russian invention; some early Zionists, including Hertz himself, were willing to accept the British offer of 
limited but instructive extent) Poland, which unlike mainly-Orthodox Serbia, has a history of rivalry 
with Russia.  
Holy Russia 
Both insiders and outsiders have made large claims about Russia being a unique culture. We can define 
these assertions as auto-exceptionalist and hetro-exceptionalist claims. To offer examples of both, 
“One Russian will know another Russian from I know not what distance. A hundred miles perhaps.” So 
said Nabokov to his biographer Andrew Field (Field 1986, 374). “Russian ideas are the most 
exhilarating, Russian thought the freest, Russian art the most exuberant; Russian food and drink are to 
me the best, and Russians themselves are, perhaps, the most interesting human beings that exist”, so 
wrote John Reed in his War in Eastern Europe, Travels in the Balkans in 1915 (Reed 1915, 103) Both 
of these statements do make claims to exceptionalism without being missionistic (or political) as such, 
although both authors had pronounced political views, deeply reactionary in one case, revolutionary in 
the other (Reed was, of course, best known for his enthusiastic reporting of the October Revolution, 
Ten Days that Shook the World). There are, of course, a contrary set of generalizations that single 
Russia out in a highly negative way. In an interview with Philip Roth, Milan Kundera argued that all 
the great movements of modern Europe, from Reformation to Enlightenment and beyond had no 
impression on Russia. 
As a concept of cultural history, Eastern Europe is Russia, with its quite specific history 
anchored in the Byzantine world. Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, just like Austria have never 
been part of Easter Europe. From the very beginning, they have taken part in the great 
adventure of Western civilization, with its Gothic, its Renaissance, its Reformation – a 
movement that had its cradle precisely in this region….The post war annexation of Central 
Europe (or at least its major part) by Russian civilization caused Western culture to lose its 
vital center of gravity. It is the most significant events in the history of the West in our 
century (quoted in Roth 2001, 91-92).  
                                                          
Uganda as a Jewish homeland. It was only the intervention of the Russian Zionists – including Weizmann – that rejected the 
offer and insisted on Palestine. It may seem strange, given the later alignment of the Cold War, but the first country to 
recognize Israel was the USSR. Israel has a large recently Russian population and several of its politicians such as Natan 
Sharansky and Avigdor Lieberman are ex-Soviet citizens and dissidents.  
Such hetro views – and many less sophisticated variations – have been articulated by such influential 
figures as Richard Pipes and Zbigniew Brzezinski. The less sophisticated views were often comical; 
during the early Cold War, Soviet aggression was even “explained” on the basis of the tight swaddling 
clothes that Russian babies had to wear!  
Scholars such as Maria Engström and Peter Duncan have examined the religious origins of Russian 
auto-exceptionalism. Duncan has written on the doctrine of The Third Rome. Engström has recently 
published on the idea of Katechon (from the Greek ό Κατέχων, ‘the withholding’, in effect, defense) 
and how this has recently guided assertive Russian foreign policy (Duncan 2000, Engström 2014). 
However there is always a high risk of literalism when trying to trace the actual influence of an idea, 
especially a religious one: do people literally believe this and – if they are in a position of political 
influence – do they really allow it to guide their actions? Or do they just use religiosity to legitimize or 
make more respectable their policies? This is hard to measure; do many Jews, a geographically diverse 
group living in numerous countries of varying degrees of secularism, really believe they belong to a 
divinely “chosen” people? Or do many Serbs believe literally in Heavenly Serbia, or Poles in Poland as 
the Christ Among Nations? Even if not, what such ideas do offer is an interpretative framework though 
which people(s) can interpret their collective historical experience. This is even more heightened if the 
historical experience is – as in the cases mentioned here – traumatic.  
What is interesting about Russian auto-exceptionalism is that it went from an openly religious idea – 
messianism – to being radically translated into secular terms over a tiny period of time, following the 
October Revolution. Holy Russia suddenly became – at least until Stalin came to power and Socialism 
in one Country became official doctrine – the fulcrum of world revolution. Squaring this circle took 
considerable invention. For an overview of this huge modernisation shift, see Richard Stites’ 
Revolutionary Dreams.  
Heavenly Serbia 
Taken at its most literal, Serbia’s most ambitious claims about itself are that Serbs are a heavenly 
people, whose sacrifice at the Battle of Kosovo Polje (1389) gave them a permanent place in heaven. 
Additionally, much of Serbs’ history have offered evidence of great sacrifice, including during both 
World Wars, and this have reinforced a national narrative with a high degree of victimhood. The 
Serbian novelist (and sometime politician) Dobrica Cosic has made the following claim: 
...almost every [Serbian] generation had its Kosovo. Such were the migrations of the XVII 
and XVIII centuries, the insurrections and wars against the Turks in 1804, 1815, 1876, and 
1912, and the rejection of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum in 1914; the rejection of the 
military defeat in 1915 and the crossing of Albania by the Serbian army; the rejection of the 
Tripartite pact with Germany on March 27, 1941; the insurrection against fascism in 1941, 
and the conduct of war under German conditions of retribution; a hundred Serbs for every 
German soldier; the rejection of Stalin’s hegemony in 1948…(quoted in Vujacic 2004, 3) 
 
There are also hetro views on heavenly Serbia. One example is Branimir Anzulovic’s book Heavenly 
Serbia, from Myth to Genocide, a sustained exercise in negative exceptionalism, which argues loudly 
that Serbs have a propensity for genocide because of their cult of the Battle of Kosovo Polje. Other 
examinations of the Kosovo cult, argue that its legacy is mixed; it has offered continuity and cohesion 
to Serbs under Ottoman rule, and it inspires has inspired several, often contradictory, modes of politics 
(or has been simply exploited by opportunistic politicians such as Milosevic (Emmert and Vucinic 
1991, Humphreys 2013).  
This sense of being a defender is something that the anthropologist Joel Halpern noted in his 
ethnographic work in rural Serbia in the 1950s; “The patriotism and pride exhibited by the Orasasi 
(occupants of the village that Halpern studied) are characteristics of all Serbs. They feel themselves to 
be much more that simple inhabitants of Serbia. They are the creators and defenders of their county. 
“We are Serbia”. (Halpern 1955, 293) 
The USA, The Shining City on the Hill  
In her book The Wordy Shipmates, Sarah Vowell writes that “the country I live in is haunted by the 
Puritans’ vision of themselves as chosen people, a beacon of righteousness that all others are to 
admire.” She draws the strongest of connections between the Puritans and American adventures ever 
since, “we’re here to help, whether you want our help or not”. (Vowell 2006, 24/25) 
Although one of the globe’s model democracies, certainly in terms of durability and continuity, the US 
too has a culture of missionistic exceptionalism, albeit articulated in more moderate language. 
America’s need to have a military presence in over 120 of the world’s states has usually been voiced in 
the language of “security”, its current preferred term is “leadership”. During the Cold War, its sense of 
civilizational struggle was salient; this has been re-forged during the War on Terror, (which has 
continued largely unchanged under Obama’s two terms, but with slightly more moderate language than 
that of the Bush administrations). Although the US has a long history of overseas engagements, the 
huge permission offered by 9/11, the nightmare of mission creep called the War on Terror, was fueled 
by victimhood.  
For decades American politicians pondered how to rid the country of “Vietnam syndrome”. They need 
worry no longer; a huge historical trauma was decommissioned by another trauma, guilt over a brutal 
invasion (and humiliating defeat) was instantly forgotten by an attack of shocking scale and visibility. 
Important here is that fact that it allowed Americans, both ordinary citizens and political elites, to feel 
that their subsequent actions – invading first Afghanistan, then Iraq, while expanding drone and other 
bombing actions – is defensive and therefore justified. They are victims seeking justice, not aggressors. 
Because of its scale and huge diversity, it is difficult to generalize about the United States; almost any 
assertion can prove to be also its opposite. However I would suggest that there is a strong stain of 
religious language and sentiment – it’s less clear if there is substantive belief behind it – in American 
public life. And for those who do not attach themselves to formal religious life, there is a highly 
developed culture of civic religion in the United States (see below for further discussion).  
Poland, Christ among Nations  
In his book, Resentment in History, Marc Ferro writes that Poland retains resentment that its sacrifices 
are not sufficiently appreciated in Christian Europe. Poland had, so the claim goes, saved Europe four 
times on different occasions: The first time by leading the defeat of the Ottomans during the Siege of 
Vienna, in 1683. He quotes the King of Poland from that time, Jean Sobiesky: “Here we are on the 
Danube, lamenting the loss of our horses and the ingratitude of those whom we saved”. (Ferro 2010, 
74). Not only had Poland saved Europe in 1683, it had saved Europe from the Bolsheviks in 1920, and 
during the Second World War Poland helped save Europe from the Nazis (and the Soviets) and then 
again from the Soviets again. The journalist Magda Jelonkiewicz (the grand-niece of a victim of the 
Katyn massacre) wrote that, “As children, we were taught that Poland’s suffering would help to redeem 
the sins of the evil world. The idea of being a victim cemented us as a nation.” (Jelonkiewicz 2010). 
The idea of Poland being a Christ among Nations has long existed, even the Marxist philosopher 
Leszek Kolakowski (1927-2009) cautiously subscribed to it: “One of the things most derided and 
mocked by twentieth-century Polish writers and thinkers was the idea of Polish messianism…it 
depicted Poland as the ‘Christ of nations’ whose suffering and crucifixion would redeem mankind.  
This seemed a ridiculous, self-comforting, and self-compensating fantasy.” (quoted in Tismaneau 1999, 
59). One might agree, but Kolakowski continues: 
 
…but on closer inspection there may have been some truth in it. Poland, the first country to 
defeat the Red Army shortly after the Revolution, prevented Europe from falling victim to 
communism, and perhaps confirmed the Hegelian notion that in every historical form the 
seeds of its future demise can be discerned from the outset. Poland was the only country 
invaded by the allied armies of Hitler and Stalin; this invasion triggered the Second World 
War. It was the first country to fight the Third Reich and one of two occupied (with 
Yugoslavia) that continued armed resistance against the German invaders. After the war, 
under communist rule, it was the first country to develop a mass movement of criticism, 
ideologically articulate, which culminated in 1956 in the change of leadership and first 
appointment of a Communist Party leader without investure by Moscow, indeed in defiance 
of the Kremlin….It was the first country in which the communist ideology clearly and 
irreversibly died away. And the first in which a mass civic movement “Solidarnosc” 
emerged and swept like fire over the land in 1980, nearly destroying the communist state 
machinery. Poland was the first….. (quoted in Tismaneau 1999, 59) 
As recently as 2006, members of the Polish Parliament have tried to have Jesus officially crowned 
King of Poland.2  
Yet unlike the other four states mentioned here, Poland’s exceptionalism is (at least at this stage in 
history) very different. In the past, its sense of victimhood has, as Ferro argued3, fed into anti-
Semitism, but now it seems largely sacrificial rather than vengeful. Poland has had territorial disputes 
(Danzig/Gdansk and Vilinius/Wilno), but these are largely resolved. Perhaps it is the positive direction 
of recent Polish history, emergence from Soviet influence, successful EU and NATO membership that 
                                                          
2 “In December 2006…forty-six members of the Polish parliament – 10 percent of the lower house – submitted a bill 
seeking to proclaim Jesus Christ the king of Poland and to follow the path of the Virgin Mary, who was declared honorary 
queen of Poland in 1665” (see Juraj Buzalka, Nation and Religion, the Politics of Commemoration in South-East Poland, 
Halle Studies in the Anthropology of Eurasia, Halle, 2006) 
3 Speaking of the 1941 Jedwabne Pogrom (which was not carried out by the Wehmacht – local people murdered at least 300 
Jews) Ferro writes: “Being taught that Jews had crucified Jesus was the first wound that these Poles had received in the 
early infancy. Passed on from generation to generation, it has aroused a desire for vengeance and that vengeance had finally 
taken place. “We were taught that in school...”. Ferro, p.11. 
has decommissioned Polish missionism? If this is accurate, then one must say that what might re-ignite 
is precisely the renewed expansionism of Putin’s Russia.  
Civic religion 
In his Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said wrote that “Every society and official tradition defends 
itself against interferences with its sanctioned narratives; over time these acquire an almost theological 
status, with founding heroes, cherished ideas and values, national allegories having an inestimable 
effect in cultural and political life.” (Said 1993, 380) What is meant by this “almost theological status” 
is worth dwelling upon. The term civic religion well describes public practices that seem to exist in a 
poorly-lit confusion of secular and sacred.  
In this sense the gradual secularization of Western societies since the enlightenment has only been a 
partially-fulfilled project, despite what religious authors might believe. For example, the philosopher 
and practicing Roman Catholic, Charles Taylor can assert – with some obvious concern from his 
perspective – that “The presumption of unbelief has become the dominant one in more and more of 
these milieu and has achieved hegemony in certain crucial ones,…” (Taylor 2007, 13). This may be 
accurate in respect to some (though not all) institutions, but this is not the full picture. I fully agree with 
Mircea Eliade’s assertion that:  
…the man who has made his choice in favor of a profane life never succeeds in completely 
doing away with religious behavior…even the most desacralized existence still preserves 
traces of a religious valorization of the world. (Eliade 1958, 23) 
Civic religions may not be concerned with deities, but they do hold up their chosen narrative, heroes 
and events as revered, much in the manner of doctrinal religion. Much heritage and custom, particularly 
in the public/political sphere sees to preserve “religious valorization of the world” and long for the 
sacred. The sacred – as a category, familiar from Durkheim and elsewhere – is pervasive in human 
cultures. One particular aspect of the sacred is of interest here, this is, its unchallengeability. To be 
unchallengeable is an enviable status, and no culture – yet alone interested political agency – would be 
in a hurry to ditch it. It is no coincidence that the most valorized of events in Soviet/Russian history – 
the Great Patriotic War – is also being referred to in popular culture as the Sacred War. History, as 
Nikolay Koposov has memorably said, is a “hard currency” in Russia. Indeed the teaching of local 
history kradevedenie, as Milena Benosvka-Sabkova argues, is both part of the religious revival in 
contemporary Russia and a vehicle for Putin’s nationalism (Benosvka-Sabkova 2008, 8). 
Israel and Victimhood  
Of the cases examined here, a strong common element is victimhood. This is victimhood in the collective 
sense; not individual victims of crime or trauma, but rather a huge collective sense of wrongdoing. Such 
collectives are problematic, because not every single member of any group – least of all of countries 
containing tens, even hundreds, of millions of citizens – will react to events in a similar manner. Collective 
victimhood claims are necessarily constructs; they can indeed be based on external events, sudden attack, 
protracted warfare, or defeat, but they need to be formulated and articulated in terms and language people can 
easily identify with (and hopefully subscribe to).  
The formulation and articulation of victimhood claims is a fascinating process and nowhere perhaps better 
than in Israel. For the contemporary observer, it seems obvious that Israel’s governing national narrative – 
and strong victimhood claim – is the European Holocaust. However, as Amos Elon has argued, in the first 
years of its statehood, Israel’s power elite rejected the Holocaust as an instructive narrative. Is seemed 
inappropriate to the pioneers and nation-builders to embrace passive victimhood; rather the heroic, military 
story Masada, was used as the young country’s governing narrative. Peter Novick notes that the myth of 
Masada – a mass-suicide by Jewish rebels during an uprising against the Romans – had no place in Jewish 
culture for 1900 years (Novick 2000, 4). But when the State of Israel was founded, Masada became its 
foundational myth. Officers of the Israeli Defense Forces, then as now, that country’s most cherished 
institution, were sworn in on the site of Masada, vowing “Masada will never fall again!” Indeed the 
archeologist responsible for the exploration of Masada, Yigael Yadin was the second Chief of Staff of the 
Israel Defense Forces (one of his replacements, the legendary Moshe Dayan, was a keen amateur 
archeologist). In his exhaustive study, Nachman Ben-Yehuda writes that: 
...commanders wanted to use the Masada as a vehicle by which to instil what they felt were 
important values in their new recruits: a willingness to fight to the end, nonsurrender, a 
renewed link to the past, an identification with ancient Jewish warriors, a love of freedom, a 
willingness to sacrifice. (Ben-Yehuda 1995, 59 italics added)  
Yet within two generations, Masada was replaced by another, more powerful narrative, the Holocaust. 
It must be stated that in the immediate post war years – when Masada was sanctioned as the national 
narrative – the recent Holocaust was not publically mentioned or institutionalized in Israel. But this all 
changed, as Amos Elon wrote:  
 
By the later Fifties, the stunned silence about the Holocaust gave way to loquacious – often 
officially sponsored – national discussion of its effects. It because common to speak of the 
Holocaust as the central trauma affecting Israeli society. It would be impossible to 
exaggerate the effect on the process of nation building. (Elon 1993)   
 
Today Masada is more of tourist site4 than the centre of a heroic national story. Dormant for almost 
2,000 years, the narrative was (very literally) dug up and placed into the centre of national 
political/cultural life, but discarded within two generations, replaced by another narrative that has a 
more useable value. This process is quite similar to the displacement of the Vietnam War by 9/11 in 
American national life, both allowed people to share a sense of collective political victimhood.  
Political victims can be defined as individuals who feel a grievance for wrong not committed to them 
personally, but committed because they belong to a certain group. Furthermore the wrongs have been 
committed by a rival group and therefore the resentment is not only directed at the individuals who 
committed the wrong, but potentially the entire group (even if many, or most, individuals of the rival 
group are innocent of any wrongdoing). To extend this group dynamic; members of a victimized group 
– who have not personally suffered wrong – nonetheless identify as victims, secondary victims or even 
“surrogate victims”, who do not belong to the group but identify with it. (LaCapra 2001) 
The bracketing of victim with innocent is almost axiomatic, and indeed some writers on victimhood 
speak of the constant asymmetry of victim/perpetrator relations. This may be true in the study of crime 
but at the group level it is more problematic, victims may be blinded to injustice because of their own 
suffered injustice. We have already distinguished between sacrificial victimhood and vengeful 
victimhood. The latter is common to missionist exceptionalism, which will typically see its actions as 
defensive and even if brutal, as nonetheless fully justified. Victimhood, if acknowledged, is a powerful 
political weapon. So attractive is victimhood that LaCapra speaks of people who become surrogate 
victims, who over-identify with victims and even wish to belong to that group, illogical as that sounds. 
                                                          
4 Furthermore, the large majority of people visiting Masada are increasingly non-Israelis. Ben-Yehuda, gives a figure of 
646,000 non- Israelis visitors for the year 1996, as compared to only 77, 351 Israelis. Ben-Yehuda, 199.  
This is the difference between mere defeat and acknowledged victimhood statues: it is very hard to 
imagine a “surrogate loser” but there are many willing surrogate victims. Victims often feel that 
ordinary restraints do not apply to them, this is equally true in international politics.  
Conclusion 
This paper has been an attempt to define missionist exceptionalism, use the term to define one aspect of 
Russian identity and explain some aspects of its foreign policy. This however has been done in a broad 
comparative context, arguing that missionist exceptionalism is certainly not unique to Russia and the 
other countries examined share certain elements. These include: a sense of victimhood, a religious core 
idea (or merging of nation with religion) although this may not articulate itself in traditional religious 
or nationalist language. Often this is articulated as civil religion, whether instead of, or alongside, 
professed religion. This is true of the US, Israel, Serbia, and Russia, all of which have a high culture of 
civic religion, as well as intrusions of formal religion into political life. There is typically one signal 
historical event, the most salient in each country’s usable past, in these cases 9/11, the Holocaust, the 
Battle of Kosovo (and the large losses of both world wars), the Great Patriotic War, and if we are to 
include Poland, Katyn. All cases mentioned have a foreign policy predicament, and the enemy/rival 
groups is often another religion (War on Terror, Israeli/Arab conflict, Serbs standoff with Kosovo (and 
its previous wars against Croats and Bosniaks), Russia’s war in Chechnya, though this confessional 
aspect is not a factor in Russia’s actions in Ukraine). However, all these actions have been articulated 
as defensive; Russian Katechon, the noted sense of Serbs being “defenders and creators” of their 
country, American and Israeli actions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Gaza etc. There is often a sense of being 
misunderstood, even to the point of hatred by rivals; “Why do they hate us?” was one of the cries of 
pain following 9/11. There is often a sense of political paranoia as defined by Hofstadter, a sense of 
being surrounded by enemies, be it NATO in Russia’s case, Arab states and Iran in Israel’s, 
internationals terrorist and their supporters in the US case, often a corresponding preoccupation with 
internal disloyalty, even traitors. (Hofstadter 1966) For all these reasons, these polities plead 
exceptionalism; explicitly that the usual rules of international law and diplomacy do not apply. Applied 
to contemporary Russia we can see all of these elements. 
References 
Anzulovic, Branimir, (1999) Heavenly Serbia, From Myth to Genocide, New York University Press 
Bazalka, Juraj, (2006) Nation and Religion, the Politics of Commemoration in South-East Poland, 
Halle Studies in the Anthropology of Eurasia  
Benovska-Sabkova, Milena, (2008) “Martyrs and Heroes: the politics of memory in the context of 
Russian post-Soviet religious revival” working paper 108. Max-Planck-Institut für ethnologische 
Forschung, available at http://www.eth.mpg.de/cms/de/publications/working_papers/wp0108.html 
Ben-Yehuda, Nachman, (1995) The Masada Myth, collective Memory and Mythmaking in Israel, 
University of Wisconsin Press 
Duncan, Peter, (2000) Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Revolution, Communism and After, 
Routeledge 
Eliade, Mircea, (1957) The Sacred and the Profane, The Nature of Religion, (translated by Willard R. 
Trask) Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
Elon, Amos, (1993) “The Politics of Memory” New York review of Books, Volume XV, Number, 16, 
October 7, 1993 
Emmert, Thomas and Vucinich, Wayne, (1991) Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle, Mediterranean 
and East European Monographs, University of Minnesota 
Engström, Maria, (2014) Contemporary Russian Messianism and New Russian Foreign Policy, 
Contemporary Security Policy, 35:3, 356-379, DOI: available at 
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.965888 
Ferro, Marc, (2010) Resentment in History, (translated by Steven Randall) Cambridge 
Field, Andrew, (1986) VN the life and art of Vladimir Nabokov, Crown Publishers  
Halpern, Joel, (1956) A Serbian Village, Social and cultural change in a Yugoslav community, Harper 
and Row  
Hofstadter, Richard, (1966) The Paranoid Style in American Politics, Jonathan Cape 
Humphreys, Brendan, (2013) The Battle Backwards, A Comparative Study of the Battle of Kosovo 
Polje (1389) and the Munich Agreement (1938) as Political Myths, University of Helsinki 
Jelonkiewicz, Magda, “Tragedy ignites debate over nationhood in Poland” The Irish Times, April 15, 
2010, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/tragedy-ignites-debate-over-nationhood-in-
poland-1.652441 
LaCapra, Dominick, (2001) Writing History, Writing Trauma, John Hopkins 
Peres, Shimon, (1995) Battling for Peace, Orion  
Reed, John, (1994/1916) The War in Eastern Europe, Travels through the Balkans in 1915, Phoenix 
Roth, Philip (2001) Shop Talk, A Writer and His Colleagues and Their Work, Jonathan Cape 
Said, Edward, (1993) Culture and Imperialism, Vintage 
Stites, Richard, (1988) Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian 
Revolution: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution, Oxford University Press 
Taylor, Charles, (2007) A Secular Age, Harvard University Press 
Tismaneau, Vladimir, ed., (1999) The Revolutions of 1989, Routledge 
Novick, Peter, (2000) The Holocaust and Collective Memory, Bloomsbury 
Vowell, Sarah, (2006) The Wordy Shipmates, Riverhear 
Vujacic, Veljko, (2004) “Reexamining the ‘Serbian Exceptionalism’ Thesis”, University of California, 
Berkeley, available at http://iseees.berkeley.edu/bps/publications/2004_03-vuja.pdf 
